Termux Nmap Recon
192.168.10.0/24 lab subnet, from a Pixel 6a · linux · hardware · time-to-root 22m
Scope
My own lab subnet, 192.168.10.0/24, three Proxmox nodes (pve1, pve2, pve3) plus
whatever VMs and services were up at the time. Whole point of the exercise: no laptop, no
Kali box, just Termux on a Pixel 6a. If a phone is the only foothold an attacker has, this is
what they’d see in the first twenty minutes.
Recon
Installed nmap in Termux and ran a service-version sweep of the whole subnet:
pkg install nmap
nmap -sV 192.168.10.0/24Three hosts up immediately identifiable as the Proxmox nodes, plus a handful of VM guests. Trimmed the scan to the interesting host once the full sweep was in:
nmap -sV -p- 192.168.10.11PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
22/tcp open ssh OpenSSH 8.9p1 Ubuntu
8006/tcp open unknown Proxmox VE web UI
3389/tcp closed ms-wbt-serverImpact
Nothing here is exploitation — this is what unauthenticated recon alone hands over. Port 8006 identifies the box as a Proxmox node without needing to touch the web UI at all; that’s enough for an attacker to go straight to known Proxmox CVEs or credential attacks instead of guessing. SSH banner gives an exact OpenSSH version, which narrows the search for anything unpatched a lot faster than blind brute-forcing.
The interesting part wasn’t the subnet, it was the platform: a phone with nothing but Termux did this in twenty-two minutes with zero setup cost. Recon doesn’t need a laptop.
Remediation
- Management interfaces like the Proxmox web UI shouldn’t be reachable from the same subnet as general lab traffic — separate VLAN, or bind to a management-only NIC.
- Version banners cost nothing to hide (
sshbanner suppression, reverse-proxying the Proxmox UI without leaking the stack) and they remove free reconnaissance value. - Rate-limit or firewall off ICMP/SYN sweeps at the router level so a full /24 sweep isn’t silent and free.